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Recalibrating Copyright Law?:
A Comment on the Supreme Court of Canada’s Decision
in CCH Canadian Limited et al. v. Law Society of Upper
Canada
By Teresa Scassa †
strained by the wording of the legislation, and the criteria outlined by the Court raise as many questions as
they resolve. The standard set for originality developed
by the Supreme Court is one that fits more easily with
utilitarian works than it does with traditional copyright
works, raising new questions about core issues in copyright law. In addition, the direction taken by the Court
would appear to run counter to current reforms being
contemplated by Parliament in its latest round of copyright revision. 6 While this may have the salutary effect of
providing a users’ rights check on the pro-creator legislative initiatives, it may also mean that the impact of the
decision will be blunted by legislative reforms that more
explicitly narrow the rights of users to access and use
copyright-protected works.
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T

he Supreme Court of Canada’s unanimous decision
in CCH Canadian Ltd. et. al. v. Law Society of
Upper Canada 1 marks a second recent decision by the
Court that has major implications for the development
of copyright law in Canada. In Théberge v. Galerie D’Art
du Petit Champlain, 2 the majority of the Court provided
a significant articulation of the balance to be struck
between the rights of creators and the rights of users of
copyright-protected works. In doing so, it embraced an
approach to copyright typical of U.S. copyright law in its
heyday. The unanimous Court in CCH Canadian makes
it clear that Théberge was not an isolated case; in an area
of law where Parliament has been strongly lobbied to
restrict users’ rights, 3 the Court seems poised to take an
interpretive approach that places limits on the scope of
the rights of owners of copyright. In CCH Canadian, the
Court does this on a number of fronts. The decision sets
a new standard for originality in Canadian copyright law,
reigns in the scope of certain acts of infringement in the
technological context, and signals an open and expansive
approach to interpreting the fair dealing defences.
The impact of CCH Canadian is likely to be farranging. For creators of so-called ‘‘utilitarian works’’, 4 the
standard of originality set by the Court will have ramifications for the scope of protection available for these
works. Individual and institutional users of works are
given broader latitude to make use of the works without
payment to the creators. The implications of the decision
may be particularly important for those who assist users
in accessing works; such as libraries, schools and other
public institutions. The decision may also have broader
implications, as the trends it signals are relied upon in
the larger context of interpreting the provisions of the
legislation in an ever-changing digital environment. 5
Yet for all of the issues that CCH Canadian
addresses and seeks to resolve, further areas of uncertainty remain. The approach that the courts may take to
interpreting fair dealing remains substantially con-

Facts

T

he CCH Canadian case emerged from a concerted
effort by Canadian law book publishers to crack
down on what they perceived to be copyright infringing
activities arising from the document delivery services of
the Great Library of the Law Society of Upper Canada
(LSUC), as well as from the provision of free-standing
photocopy machines in the library. The publishers
argued that their products, which included edited reasons for judgment, head notes, case summaries, topical
indices and treatises, were protected by copyright, and
that the LSUC, by not complying with the rules set out
in section 30.2 of the Copyright Act, 7 by not strictly
monitoring fair dealing by its patrons, and by providing
free-standing photocopiers with insufficient warnings
regarding copyright infringement, was without an
acceptable defence for the infringing acts. The LSUC’s
response to these claims was wide-ranging. It challenged
the subsistence of copyright in many of the publishers’
works, it argued that it was not liable for authorizing
infringement, that its patrons were not infringing, and
that any infringing copying activities would fall within
the scope of the fair dealing defence.
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The issues in the case had received a mixed reception in the courts below. At trial, Gibson J. found that the
bulk of the publishers’ works at issue in the case failed to
meet the threshold for originality. 8 The Court of Appeal
reversed on this point, finding originality in the publishers’ works and finding the library liable for authorizing copyright infringement through the provision of
free-standing photocopiers for its patrons. 9 The Great
Library was also found liable for infringing copyright via
its document delivery service to patrons of the library. 10
In contrast to the trial decision, the Supreme Court of
Canada found that copyright subsisted in most of the
works of the publishers, found the LSUC was not liable
for authorizing infringement, and expanded the scope of
the fair dealing defence.

Originality
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P

erhaps the most anticipated part of the Supreme
Court of Canada’s decision in CCH Canadian was
that which tackled the issue of the standard for originality in Canadian copyright law. This issue had been
the topic of much debate in recent years, ever since the
U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Feist Publications Inc. v. Rural Telephone Services Co. Inc. 11 In that
case, the U.S. Supreme Court bluntly rejected ‘‘sweat of
the brow’’ as a basis for finding the requisite originality
in a work for the purposes of copyright protection. The
U.S. Court ruled that copyright could only subsist in an
original selection or arrangement of data, and that originality in that selection or arrangement would require a
‘‘creative spark’’ 12 or some ‘‘minimal level of creativity’’. 13
A few years later, in Tele-Direct (Publications) Inc. v.
American Business Information Inc., 14 the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal ruled, on a somewhat similar set of
facts to those in Feist, that there was likewise a requirement of some minimal amount of ‘‘creativity’’ for a
finding of originality in Canadian copyright law. 15 The
Canadian decision in Tele-Direct left much uncertainty
and debate as to the appropriate test for originality in
Canadian law. 16 By the time the Federal Court of Appeal
heard the appeal in CCH Canadian, it was ready to
distance itself from Decary J.A.’s references to ‘‘creativity’’
in Tele-Direct. 17 The majority of the Court took the view
that ‘‘creativity’’ set the threshold for originality too high.
Instead, they extracted from Tele-Direct, and adopted in
their own reasons the formula of ‘‘skill, judgment and
labour’’, 18 which was a grammatically questionable
rephrasing of an earlier standard of ‘‘skill, judgment or
labour’’. 19 This did little to resolve the controversy over
originality. The Australian Federal Court’s decision in
Telstra Corporation Ltd. v. Desktop Marketing Systems
Pty Ltd. 20 gave hope to those who advocated a pure
‘‘sweat of the brow’’ standard of originality in Canada,
while others argued that ‘‘skill, judgment and labour’’
precluded ‘‘sweat of the brow’’.
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McLachlin C.J. made relatively short work of the
long controversy over the standard for originality in
Canadian copyright law. She identified ‘‘sweat of the
brow’’ as occupying one end of an originality continuum, and the U.S. ‘‘creativity’’ requirement as occupying the other. In typical Canadian fashion, she took
the view that ‘‘the correct position falls between these
extremes.’’ 21 More specifically, she identified that originality in Canadian copyright law required first that the
work ‘‘must be more than a mere copy of another
work.’’ 22 Beyond that, while it need not be creative ‘‘in
the sense of being novel or unique’’, 23 it must reflect ‘‘an
exercise of skill and judgment’’, 24 which in turn incorporates some form of ‘‘intellectual effort’’. 25
In McLachlin C.J.’s view, the ‘‘sweat of the brow’’
standard adopted in the U.K. and Australia is inconsistent with the original Berne Convention, 26 and with the
approach of continental civilian jurisdictions. It is also, in
her view, inconsistent with the purpose of Canadian
copyright law in that to reward industriousness alone
would disrupt the balance between the rights and interests of creators and those of society more generally. 27
More specifically, she identified the interest of society ‘‘in
maintaining a robust public domain that could help
foster future creative innovation.’’ 28 A requirement of
‘‘skill and judgment’’ as a prerequisite to copyright
would, in her view, provide ‘‘room for the public domain
to flourish as others are able to produce new works by
building on the ideas and information contained in the
works of others.’’ 29 In this regard, she embraced the position of O’Connor J. in Feist that there is no copyright in
facts. 30 In the end result, McLachlin C.J. affirmed that an
original work must originate from the author and ‘‘be
the product of the exercise of skill and judgment that is
more than trivial’’. 31 Applying this standard to the facts of
the case, she found all of the works in question to be
original.
Although the Court in CCH Canadian is unequivocal about the new standard for originality in Canadian
copyright law, the standard chosen by the Court leaves
room for its own interpretive issues. The standard set by
the U.S. Supreme Court in Feist has been referred to by
the Federal Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of
Canada as that of ‘‘creativity’’, 32 although in reality, the
U.S. Supreme Court required only a ‘‘spark’’ or a ‘‘modicum’’ of creativity. In rejecting this standard, McLachlin
C.J.’s critique of the U.S. standard is not that it is too
ambiguous or difficult to interpret on a case-by-case
basis; 33 rather, her critique appears to be that it sets too
high a threshold for originality. In her view, the Canadian standard of ‘‘skill and judgment’’ requires something less than a ‘‘modicum’’ or ‘‘spark’’ of creativity. She
argued: ‘‘A creativity standard implies that something
must be novel or non-obvious — concepts more properly associated with patent law than copyright law.’’ 34 Yet
this critique is overstated. 35 While it might be true of a
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standard of ‘‘creativity’’ simpliciter, it is much less true of
a standard that requires only a ‘‘minimal level’’ or ‘‘spark’’
of creativity. In practical terms, a ‘‘spark’’ of creativity
may be very little indeed.

✄ REMOVE

Username: bmorriso

Date: 3-AUG-05

Time: 10:36

Filename: D:\reports\cjlt\articles\03_02\scassa.dat

Seq: 3

The Canadian Court’s newly minted standard of
originality is not obviously less exacting than the U.S.
standard, nor is it any less ambiguous. In elaborating on
the standard of ‘‘skill and judgment’’, McLachlin C.J.
stated that the ‘‘exercise of skill and judgment required
to produce the work must not be so trivial that it could
be characterized as a purely mechanical exercise.’’ 36 It is
difficult to see how the assessment of a non-trivial exercise of skill and judgment is any less subjective than the
assessment of a ‘‘spark’’ of creativity. Further, it is difficult
to see how, in terms of practical effect, a non-trivial exercise of skill and judgment will amount to anything other
than a ‘‘spark’’ of creativity. While it is possible to argue
that the different standards might result in different decisions in some cases, the reality is that each is sufficiently
subjective and fluid to result in identical decisions in a
wide range of cases. While not wanting to go so far as to
say that the result in any given case will depend on what
the judge had for breakfast, this consideration is, in practical terms, likely to be as significant as the difference
between the two standards.
It is arguable that the Canadian standard is more
oriented towards utilitarian works than is the U.S. standard. Utilitarian works are ones that do not have creativity or artistic expression as a main object; rather, they
are works that are primarily functional, such as telephone directories, computer software, or fillable forms.
In such a context, assessing the ‘‘intellectual effort’’ in the
form of skill and judgment that goes into the works
makes more sense than conceptualizing this effort as a
‘‘spark’’ of creativity. It is arguable that the U.S. language
of ‘‘creativity’’, even if what is required is minimal, could
place utilitarian works at a disadvantage in assessing their
worthiness for copyright protection. 37 By contrast, it
could be argued that the Canadian standard, by focusing
on ‘‘skill and judgment’’ or intellectual effort, embraces
the possibility of utilitarian works being protected by
copyright wherever there is some authorial effort. However, the reality in the United States is that utilitarian
works have been protected using the Feist standard; 38 it
is not clear whether the difference in semantic emphasis
is significant enough to regard the two tests as marking
different points on an ‘‘originality’’ continuum, as
opposed to the two being differently coloured dots at
more or less the same point in the continuum.
Although the U.S. standard has been criticized for
importing a subjective assessment of creativity into the
originality analysis, the new Canadian standard is open
to criticism for similar reasons, though on the other end
of the issue. The Canadian standard, formulated in CCH
Canadian in the context of utilitarian, rather than more
traditional creative works, emphasizes skill, judgment,
and intellectual effort as being hallmarks of originality.

91

Although McLachlin C.J. is careful to note that ‘‘creative
works will by definition be ‘original’ and covered by
copyright’’, 39 this ultimately does little more than confirm that creativity reflects an exercise of skill and judgment. Any other reading would lead to the conclusion
that works of a certain kind are inherently ‘‘creative’’, and
therefore protectable by copyright.
The ‘‘skill and judgment’’ standard may put into
question copyright in a range of works on the basis of
fairly subjective considerations. For example, while a
photograph taken by a professional photographer would
be considered as original under the CCH Canadian standard because its composition reflects ‘‘skill and judgment’’ on the part of the photographer, it is less clear
whether a family snapshot, taken by a parent too busy to
finish reading the manual on how to operate the camera,
reflects any skill and judgment on the part of the
‘‘author’’ of the photo. A gleeful splashing of paint by a
small child on canvas reflects very little skill or judgment;
the same splashing of paint by a renowned artist will be
presumed to reflect his or her skill and judgment as an
artist. When seen from the perspective of more traditional copyright works, the U.S. ‘‘modicum’’ or ‘‘spark’’ of
creativity test eliminates the likelihood of distinctions
being made between more traditional kinds of artistic
works on the basis of subjective assessments of either the
quality of the work or the pedigree of the creator. The
difference between the Canadian and the U.S. standards,
therefore, is one of perspective. The U.S. standard
embraces traditional copyright works while creating considerable leeway for utilitarian works. The Canadian
standard embraces a broad range of utilitarian works
while raising the spectre of more subjective interpretations of copyright in the traditional categories of copyright works.
The concern about subjective assessments of the
intellectual effort that goes into a work is not artificial. In
considering the works at issue in this case, it is clear that
McLachlin C.J.’s inquiry into intellectual effort or skill
and judgment includes an assessment of the ‘‘intellectual
pedigree’’ of the creators of the work. In considering the
head notes, for example, she refers to the need of the
authors to ‘‘use their knowledge about the law and
developed ability to determine legal ratios to produce
the headnotes.’’ 40 In assessing the ‘‘skill and judgment’’
that went into case summaries and topical indices,
McLachlin C.J. also references the kind of skill and judgment that comes from legal training and expertise in the
subject area.
Interestingly, McLachlin C.J. finds no ‘‘skill and
judgment’’ in the work that goes into editing the judicial
reasons. She refers to the correction of ‘‘minor grammatical errors and spelling mistakes’’ 41 as involving skill and
judgment that is ‘‘too trivial to warrant copyright protection.’’ 42 This would presumably imply that the ability to
revise a work for spelling and grammatical errors
amounts to a trivial exercise of skill and judgment, some-
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thing that would likely be challenged by anyone with
experience in a post-secondary institution. 43 It is wrong
to say such work does not reflect skill and judgment
(unless some forms of skill and judgment are valued
above others); it is perhaps more palatable to say that
such work lacks a spark of creativity, as the correction of
spelling and grammar generally involves ensuring conformity with a fairly fixed set of rules.
In summary then, the Court’s new standard for originality raises as many questions as it resolves. While it
reflects a positive trend by the Court towards a more
balanced approach to interpreting the Copyright Act,
and a welcome concern for the public domain, it is
questionable whether the attempt to be distinctly ‘‘Canadian’’ in our approach to originality has led us to our
own distinct set of interpretive problems and issues.
Copyright law has increasingly been stretched to accommodate a growing range of utilitarian works. Interpretations of the Act or of basic copyright principles such as
originality should be sensitive to the differences between
the more traditional kinds of copyright works and the
ever-increasing range of utilitarian works.
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Infringement by Authorization

I

t was argued by the law book publishers that the
provision of free-standing photocopy machines in the
Great Library amounted to an authorization of any
infringing copying done by patrons of the library. If this
were the case, the LSUC could be held liable for the
authorization of the infringing acts. The publishers drew
support for their argument from the decision of the
High Court of Australia in University of New South
Wales v. Moorhouse, 44 which addressed the specific case
of library photocopy machines. In Moorhouse, the High
Court found that the provision of free-standing photocopy machines by a university library amounted to the
authorization of any infringing copying by users of the
library. The Court applied the same standard of ‘‘sanction, approve, countenance’’, but took the view that
. . . a person who has under his control the means by which
an infringement of copyright may be committed — such as
a photocopying machine — and who makes it available to
other persons, knowing, or having reason to suspect, that it
is likely to be used for the purpose of committing an
infringement, and omitting to take reasonable steps to limit
its use to legitimate purposes, would authorize any infringement that resulted from its use. 45

The Federal Court of Appeal in CCH Canadian
cited Moorhouse with approval, and reached the same
conclusion as the Australian Court on the issue of
authorization by the Great Library. Because the library
provided the photocopying machines and provided the
copyright-protected works all in one convenient location, and because the machines could be expected to be
used for copying these works, Linden J.A. opined that the
LSUC’s acts made it ‘‘as if the Law Society operates a
game park, and provides each of its invited guests with a

loaded gun.’’ 46 The Court of Appeal faulted the Law
Society for its lack of concrete effort to take steps ‘‘to
monitor, to police or to otherwise dissuade its patrons
from infringing copyright or to ensure that its
photocopiers were used legitimately.’’ 47
The Supreme Court of Canada reached a different
conclusion from both the Federal Court of Appeal and
the Australian High Court. The result comes as a surprise, since the other decisions reflected emerging and
existent practices in the university and library sectors in
both countries. For example, licence agreements with
reprography collectives in Canada have reflected an
understanding that some library photocopying
amounted to infringement, and that libraries could be
held legally responsible. 48 McLachlin C.J.’s decision
briefly canvassed the extensive case law on ‘‘authorization’’ to distill some basic principles. She rejected the
notion accepted by the Federal Court of Appeal that
where a library is aware of the likelihood of infringing
copying, it will authorize infringement if it fails to take
concrete steps to prevent the illicit copying. Noting that
the case law established the test of authorization as to
‘‘sanction, approve and countenance’’, 49 McLachlin C.J.
insisted that the term ‘‘countenance’’ be given its
strongest possible meaning. She took the view that ‘‘a
person does not authorize infringement by authorizing
the mere use of equipment that could be used to
infringe copyright.’’ 50 Further, she noted that ‘‘Courts
should presume that a person who authorizes an activity
does so only so far as it is in accordance with the law.’’ 51
The presumption is rebuttable if ‘‘a certain relationship
or degree of control’’ 52 can be established. While she
acknowledged that authorization need not be express,
but can be implied from the facts, she did not find that
control of users is required as a positive step to avoid
infringement through authorization.
The Supreme Court of Canada specifically rejected
the line of reasoning developed in Moorhouse .
McLachlin C.J. took the view that ‘‘the Moorhouse
approach to authorization shifts the balance in copyright
too far in favour of the owner’s rights and unnecessarily
interferes with the proper use of copyrighted works for
the good of society as a whole.’’ 53 She found no authorization on the basis of a combination of factors, including
a lack of evidence of actual infringing use of the copiers,
and the ultimate lack of control that the Great Library
would have over the actions of its patrons. 54 Noting that
there was no master-servant or other relationship
between the Library and its patrons, she found that there
was no basis for any exercise of control.
The decision on authorization is an important one,
and one with potentially far-reaching consequences. It is
made in a context where university and public libraries
have struggled under the threat of liability for authorizing copyright infringement, and where many patrons
have been, as a consequence, on the receiving end of an
increase in copying costs to offset blanket copyright
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licences entered into with reprography collectives with a
view to eliminating this potential liability. The decision
amounts to a significant victory for libraries and library
patrons.

✄ REMOVE

Username: bmorriso

Date: 3-AUG-05

Time: 10:36

Filename: D:\reports\cjlt\articles\03_02\scassa.dat

Seq: 5

The decision should also be considered in a broader
context of the debate over the liability of providers of
technology for infringing uses of this technology. 55
While the photocopy and fax machines at issue in CCH
Canadian are now on the low-tech end of the spectrum,
it is unfortunate that the Court did not provide a set of
reasons that addressed the relationship of technologies of
reproduction and distribution to issues of authorization.
Instead, by bluntly identifying control over users as a
factor, McLachlin C.J. severely limits authorization as a
basis for copyright liability.
The full significance of the decision in relation to
technologies of reproduction and distribution is more
difficult to gauge. However, the recent litigation in BMG
Canada Inc. v. John Doe 56 suggests that the implications
may be far ranging. In that case, which involved, inter
alia, the issue of whether music downloads over the
Internet infringed copyright, von Finckenstein J. of the
Federal Court of Canada took the view that those who
uploaded music onto a shared directory available to
others over the Internet did not authorize copyright
infringement. Citing the CCH Canadian decision, von
Finckenstein J. stated:
I cannot see a real difference between a library that places a
photocopy machine in a room full of copyrighted material
and a computer user that places a personal copy on a shared
directory linking to a P2P service. In either case the preconditions to copying and infringement are set up but the
element of authorization is missing. 57

There are few differences between the two situations when it comes to the level of control; the person
who stores files on a shared directory does not control
the people who access those files, or the purposes for
which they access the files. On the other hand, uploaders
are in a significantly different position from a library in a
number of ways. First, the rights of uploaders of music to
reproduce that music into shared directories is subject to
challenge in a way that the rights of libraries to own or
provide the contents of the libraries to users is not. The
rights of users of libraries to access those works is
unquestioned, and they can make any number of uses of
the works that do not infringe copyright in the work,
from reading, borrowing, and browsing, to copying in
amounts and for purposes that are considered fair
dealing. The rights of individuals to make use of music
from the Internet are not as broad, and are constrained
by the terms of the private copying exception, and by
geography and national borders. It is also much less
likely that any significant amount of copying of music
from the Internet would qualify as fair dealing under the
Act. Another key difference, of course, is between technology for reproduction and technology that intrinsically
links both reproduction and distribution, two acts that
are treated separately under the Act. Leaving these issues
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aside for a different case comment, it is sufficient to note
here that the potential impact of the Supreme Court’s
approach to ‘‘authorization’’ in CCH Canadian is far
ranging.

Fair Dealing

T

he main issue of fair dealing in this case was raised
in relation to the custom photocopy service of the
Great Library. Under this service, the staff of the Great
Library would photocopy materials requested by patrons
and send the materials to them. The issues here were
twofold: whether the Library could benefit from any fair
dealing exception that would apply to its patrons, and
whether the copying of the extracts in the circumstances
amounted to fair dealing.
The copying done by the Great Library as part of its
document delivery service was performed under the
Library’s Access to the Law Policy. This policy indicated
that, in pursuance of the objectives of serving the administration of justice and the rule of law, the Library would
provide ‘‘[s]ingle copies of library materials, required for
the purposes of research, review, private study and criticism, as well as use in court, tribunal and government
proceedings’’. 58 The policy stipulated that only single
copies would be made, and that the copying would only
be for specific purposes made explicit by patrons to staff
in advance of the copying. The policy set other parameters to copying as well.
At trial, the Great Library asserted a fair dealing
defence of its custom photocopy service on the basis that
its Access to the Law Policy amounted to fair dealing
with copyright-protected works. While the Court of
Appeal had accepted that the Law Society could invoke
the purposes of its patrons in a fair dealing defence, the
majority of the Court had found insufficient evidence of
the purposes of the patrons to support the defence. The
Supreme Court of Canada’s approach to this issue gave
greater scope to the fair dealing defence: according to
McLachlin C.J., not only could the Great Library rely
upon the purposes of its patrons to establish the defence,
it was entitled to rely upon its general practices rather
than upon specific evidence of usage by individual
patrons. In the words of McLachlin C.J.:
‘‘Dealing’’ connotes not individual acts, but a practice or
system. This comports with the purpose of the fair dealing
exception, which is to ensure that users are not unduly
restricted in their ability to use and disseminate copyrighted
works. Persons or institutions relying on the s. 29 fair
dealing exception need only prove that their own dealings
with copyrighted works were for the purpose of research
and private study and were fair. They may do this either by
showing that their own practices and policies were researchbased and fair, or by showing that all individual dealings
with the materials were in fact research-based and fair. 59

It would seem that if the ‘‘big picture’’ policy is
relied upon, the level of actual compliance with the
policy is of lesser importance. Once again, the decision of
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the Court should prove extremely encouraging to
libraries and universities which attempt, through document delivery services, to provide materials to patrons in
keeping with fair dealing principles, but which lack the
means or resources to be certain that each individual
request complies with the requirements of fair dealing.
The Court’s decision in relation to the actual interpretation of the fair dealing defence is also welcome,
given that this has been a relatively under-litigated area
of copyright law. The structure of the defence in the
legislation may be largely to blame; by framing the
defence narrowly, it invites a more restrictive approach
to interpretation. 60 Perhaps surprisingly, in this context,
the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada breathes
significant life into the defence, beginning with
McLachlin C.J.’s statement that ‘‘[i]n order to maintain
the proper balance between the rights of a copyright
owner and users’ interests, [fair dealing] must not be
interpreted restrictively.’’ 61
In order to qualify as fair dealing, a use of a work
must fall within one of the three statutory provisions
that establish the defence. 62 This means that the use of
the work must be for research or private study, 63 criticism or comment, 64 or news reporting. 65 In CCH Canadian, it was the use of the works for ‘‘research or private
study’’ that was at issue. McLachlin C.J. mandated a
‘‘ large and liberal interpretation ’’ 66 of the term
‘‘research’’. As such, the defence would not be limited to
private or non-commercial forms of research. Research
for the purpose of serving clients in a legal practice
would certainly fall within the scope of the defence,
notwithstanding the fact that such research is carried out
for profit. 67 The determination of what amount of
dealing is ‘‘fair’’ is one that must be made on the facts of
a given case. McLachlin C.J. approved of and adopted the
set of six criteria outlined by Linden J.A. in the Federal
Court of Appeal decision in the case. The factors are
drawn in part from a decision by Lord Denning in Hubbard v. Vosper, 68 and in part from the statutory criteria
for assessing fair use in the U.S. The factors are:
(1) the purpose of the dealing; (2) the character of the
dealing; (3) the amount of the dealing; (4) alternatives to the
dealing; (5) the nature of the work; and (6) the effect of the
dealing on the work. 69

The factors are accompanied by the usual caveats:
that they may not all be present in any given case, that
no one factor is determinative, and that other factors
might also be relevant, depending upon the particular set
of facts. 70
It is odd that in a case where the Court struggled to
develop a uniquely Canadian standard for originality, it
was so quick to graft what are essentially the American
fair use criteria onto a very different sort of defence
under Canadian copyright law. While the criteria may
be useful as analytical tools, they could well have been
better crafted to the particular context of fair dealing
under Canadian law. For example, ‘‘the purpose of the
dealing’’ is hardly a criterion for determining if a partic-

ular dealing is fair; rather, it is a precondition for the
existence of the defence. In order to qualify as fair
dealing, the use made of the work must fall within one
of the specified categories of use as outlined in sections 29, 29.1 and 29.2. 71
‘‘Purpose of the dealing’’ is thus best left off a set of
criteria for assessing fair dealing, as it is already specifically addressed in the legislation. To leave it as a criterion
suggests that ‘‘purpose of the dealing’’ has a meaning that
goes beyond the purposes required by the Act. This is, in
fact, what occured in CCH Canadian: In this regard,
McLachlin C.J. indicated that some allowable purposes
may be considered more or less fairer than others,
depending upon the context. Thus, she suggested that
‘‘research done for commercial purposes may not be as
fair as research done for charitable purposes’’. 72 With
respect, this is a troubling distinction, and one that
appears to contradict earlier statements regarding the
defence. In the statutory defence for ‘‘research or private
study’’, the term research is not qualified, and McLachlin
C.J. herself urges that the defence be given a large and
liberal interpretation so as to preserve the balance
between the interests of copyright owners and society
generally. Much research is conducted for somebody’s
profit, as is, for example, research by lawyers for their
clients. There is no sensible reason why the nature of
one’s clients or profit motives should limit one’s access to
the defence. It might be reasonable, in some circumstances to find that uses for certain commercial purposes
do not amount to fair dealing where, for example, the
research is used to create a product in competition with
the original, but these considerations can be dealt with
under other criteria in the list.
The second consideration is the ‘‘character’’ of the
dealing. This allows a court to consider the way in which
the works were used. McLachlin C.J. gave the example of
multiple copies of a work being widely distributed, and
suggests that this kind of dealing would likely be unfair
as compared with the use of a single copy for a specific
purpose. 73 She also noted that the particular practice in
any given industry as to how works are customarily dealt
with may be useful in assessing fairness. However, this
latter consideration has the potential to be problematic.
If an industry or even a group of users has developed a
series of practices out of fear that the traditionally narrow
fair dealing defences might not be available to them, the
weight of this practice under the more expansively
defined approach by the Supreme Court of Canada
would have the effect of constricting the scope of the
available defence. Given the spotty history of the fair
dealing defence, a reliance on past practices to interpret
the actual scope of the users’ rights may be problematic.
The third criterion identified by the Court is the
amount of the work. McLachlin C.J. indicated that
‘‘[b]oth the amount of the dealing and the importance of
the work allegedly infringed should be considered’’. 74
The reference to the ‘‘importance of the work’’ must
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surely be a misstatement; such qualitative judgments
about the worth of the underlying work should be
avoided. Instead it might well have been intended to be
an instruction to consider the importance of the extract
from the work in assessing fair dealing. McLachlin C.J.
reiterates the common caveat that insubstantial or trivial
taking from a work is not infringement, and so does not
need to be considered under a fair dealing analysis. 75 She
indicates as well that it is possible for the copying of an
entire work to be fair, depending on the purpose. 76 Thus,
it might be fair dealing to copy an entire journal article
for the purpose of research, but not to copy the entirety
of another work in a different context.
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Under ‘‘alternatives to the dealing’’ McLachlin C.J.
suggests that where there is ‘‘ a non-copyrighted
equivalent of a work that could have been used instead
of the copyrighted work, this should be considered by
the court.’’ 77 In her more specific analysis of the facts of
the case, she also appears to consider whether there was
an alternative to the custom photocopy service provided
by the Great Library. She notes, for example, that it
would not be reasonable to expect all patrons of the
service to do their research on site at the Great Library,
as so many of them lived outside a reasonable geographic radius of the library. 78
The consideration of such alternatives in a fair
dealing analysis is also problematic. It is not clear, for
example, on these reasons, whether the existence of a
free online source for court decisions, such as CanLii 79 or
court Web sites, would mean that the delivery of a copy
of a court decision from a case reporter, complete with
headnote and case summary, could not constitute fair
dealing, since an alternative existed to the researcher that
would not infringe the copyright of the publisher. In
theory, this should not matter: the issue with fair dealing
really should be whether a particular use of a work
amounted to fair dealing; the analysis should not
degrade into whether the user considered or pursued
other avenues to acquire the work. 80 In a similar vein, it
is not clear why the photocopying of an article for
research or private study by someone who lives next
door to a library should be evaluated differently from the
same act by someone who lives at greater remoteness
from the library. The fair dealing analysis cannot become
bogged down by this level of detail about the user, the
work used, competing works, and other ways in which
the user might have accessed or used the work. The issue
of the ‘‘non-copyright equivalent’’ of a work raises even
more potential problems: what is an ‘‘equivalent’’ to a
particular work, such that copying the work could cease
to be fair dealing because of the existence of the unprotected ‘‘equivalent’’? 81
In a related consideration, it is not clear how the fact
that the publishers provide many of their major works
through online subscription services that can be
remotely accessed should be factored in under this criterion of analysis. It is certainly much more difficult to say
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that the Great Library can fairly provide a document
delivery service to those unable to travel to the library to
do legal research if one is willing to accept that a real
alternative existed in the form of an online subscription
service. The fact that this is a paid service is likely offset
by the fact that the research is being conducted for profit
in most cases. While this raises interesting access to justice and public policy issues, the fact is that neither the
existence of these alternatives nor the public policy issues
are considered by the Court. To be meaningful, fair
dealing with a work should be fair dealing with a work
regardless of whether other commercial options existed
by which a user could have paid for the same extract
from the work. The introduction by the Supreme Court
of Canada of the criterion of ‘‘alternatives to the work’’
leaves open the possibility that future courts will make
much of pay-per-use models in an assessment of fair
dealing in a variety of contexts. The reality is that digitization makes possible the marketing of works in a
variety of formats, and according to a variety of business
models. The impact of these changing practices on a fair
dealing analysis should not be significant according to
the broad principles laid out by the Court, but may end
up being significant by virtue of the structure and criteria
for analysis set out in the same decision.
The point seems to be partially addressed when
McLachlin C.J. makes one clarification of the issue of
alternatives in the defence of fair dealing which is likely
to be of great importance to libraries and universities in
particular. She states that the ‘‘availability of a licence is
not relevant to deciding whether a dealing has been
fair.’’ 82 In other words, the fact that a photocopy licence
was available to the Great Library through a collective
society, but was not obtained, does not have any bearing
on the assessment of whether there was fair dealing. The
Court notes that
If a copyright owner were allowed to license people to use
its work and then point to a person’s decision not to obtain
a licence as proof that his or her dealings were not fair, this
would extend the scope of the owner’s monopoly over the
use of his or her work in a manner that would not be
consistent with the Copyright Act ’s balance between
owner’s rights and user’s interests. 83

This is an extremely important statement for
libraries and universities, which have struggled with the
costs of reprography licences to protect them against
copyright infringement actions. Interestingly enough, the
Copyright Act suggests that Parliament might take a different view on this point. Section 30.3 exempts educational institutions, libraries, archives, and museums from
copyright infringement in the provision of free-standing
photocopiers if, inter alia, the institution has entered into
an agreement with a collective society. Quite apart from
the fact that the Court’s decision on authorization has
undermined any basis for the liability of a library,
museum, or archive in the provision of free-standing
photocopy machines, the Court’s position emphasizes
that the fair dealing defence is available notwithstanding
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any other exemptions that might be available in the
Act. 84
The fifth criterion, the nature of the work, allows
courts to consider such things as whether the work is
published or unpublished, confidential, and so on. In
applying this criterion to the facts, the Court also
assessed the nature of the work in terms of its particular
purpose and audience. Because the works at issue in
CCH Canadian were court decisions and other legal
research documents, the Court emphasized the public
interest in having unimpeded access to these works. The
public interest in access to these works is an important
factor for the Court throughout the decision, a fact that
is not surprising given the Court’s own involvement in
and commitment to the fair administration of justice in
Canada. The question for more general-purpose libraries
is to determine the extent to which the nature of the
works at issue was a deciding factor in the fair dealing
analysis.
Finally, in any fair dealing analysis, courts are to
consider the effect of the dealing on the work. Where a
work is reproduced so that the reproduction will compete in the marketplace with the original, a finding of
fair dealing is less likely. The Court also considered
whether the market for the publisher’s works was
affected by the copying done through the document
delivery service of the Great Library. The Court noted
that no such evidence was introduced by the publishers.
It is refreshing to have a view from the Supreme
Court of Canada on the proper interpretation of the fair
dealing defences contained in the Copyright Act. The
Court provides an important statement that the defences
should be interpreted with a view to the overall purpose
of the legislation first articulated by the Court in
Th éberge . This alone suggests a more expansive
approach to the defence that has been seen up to this
point in Canadian case law on fair dealing. The Court
has also given its blessing to a set of criteria that allow for
a more flexible, context-specific analysis of fair dealing
on a case-by-case basis. While this kind of guidance is
welcome, the Court has offered some vague pronouncements and generalities regarding these criteria that may
lead to some potentially disturbing results in future
cases. To the extent that these criteria are drawn largely
from the U.S. ‘‘fair use’’ criteria, it is also reasonable to
consider the extent that U.S. fair use case law can now be
referenced in constructing a fair dealing argument.

Purpose of Canadian Copyright
Law: A Balancing of Interests

A

s noted above, the Court’s statement of the purpose
of copyright informs its approach to issues of originality, authorization, and fair dealing in this case. The
statement of purpose is interesting for a number of reasons. It cements a very recent shift in approach to copyright law by the Canadian Supreme Court. In theory, at
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least, it also further aligns Canadian copyright law with
U.S. law. In this regard, the new ‘‘purpose’’ of Canadian
copyright law is worthy of some analysis.
McLachlin C.J. adopted the statement of the purpose of copyright law in Canada that was put forth by a
majority of the Court in Théberge, and later reiterated in
Desputeaux v. Chouette. 85 Without a doubt now, the
proper approach to interpreting copyright law in Canada
is to take an approach that balances ‘‘promoting the
public interest in the encouragement and dissemination
of works of the arts and intellect and obtaining a just
reward for the creator.’’ 86 This approach is one that is
prepared to recognize limitations to creators’ rights.
While in Théberge, this interpretive approach involved
the majority in giving a more limited scope to the right
of reproduction, the issue in CCH Canadian turned on
the interpretation of ‘‘originality’’ as a line between copyright protection and the public domain, and the interpretation of the rights of users under the fair dealing
defences.
The balancing approach articulated by the Supreme
Court in Théberge, and reiterated in subsequent recent
decisions marks an important judicial statement of the
purpose of Canadian copyright law. While some have
argued that this was the underlying purpose in the
past, 87 judicial interpretations have not consistently
reflected this purpose, and in fact, some have overtly
taken a more narrow approach to the interpretation of
copyright legislation. 88 In this context, the importance of
the approach of the Court should not be underestimated; it sends a clear message to other courts as to how
the legislation should be interpreted. This message has
not been lost. In BMG Canada Inc. v. John Doe, 89 von
Finckenstein J. of the Federal Court Trial Division ruled
that Internet music file-sharing did not amount to copyright infringement. Although he referred to relatively
little authority to support this view, the Supreme Court’s
new direction was clearly an influencing factor. 90
The Canadian Supreme Court’s statement of purpose is largely drawn from both the U.S. Constitution,
and U.S. case law that follows it. In the U.S. Constitution,
Congress is granted jurisdiction over copyright law in the
following terms: it may legislate ‘‘to Promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries.’’ 91 U.S. copyright case law has been consistently more favourable to
users’ rights, in part because of judicial attitudes conditioned by the statement of purpose, and in part because
of the more generous rights given to users in the U.S.
Copyright Act. 92 This is in part reflective of the fact that
the U.S. statement of the purpose of copyright law is
embedded in the Constitution, and thus serves as a
guide to both Congress and the courts. 93 By contrast,
Parliament receives no comparable constitutional direction in its approach to copyright monopolies. The
Supreme Court of Canada’s interpretive approach ulti-
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mately only directs courts as to how they should interpret the provisions of the legislation; it has no effect on
Parliament’s policy-making function. It is also questionable whether the Court’s direction would survive an
explicit restatement of the purpose of copyright by Parliament.
The new approach signaled by the Court comes at a
time when there are many indications within the United
States that there is a legislative will to reduce the public
domain and to produce legislation that is often significantly more restrictive of users’ rights. Notable examples
include the enactment of the Digital Millenium Copyright Act, 94 and the extension of the term of protection
for copyright law in the 1998 Copyright Term Extension
Act. 95 In addition, the recent United States’ Supreme
Court ruling in Eldred v. Ashcroft 96 makes it clear that in
the view of the majority of that Court, the courts should
defer to the means chosen by the legislature to achieve
the balance of rights. 97 In Canada, we are left with a
situation where Parliament is not bound by the Constitution to achieve any particular balance, but where the
Courts have adopted the view that copyright law serves
to achieve a balance between the rights of users and
creators of works. The situation is, if anything, more
tenuous than that in the United States. In any event, the
new Canadian orientation may be too little, too late in
the larger scheme of where copyright law is heading.
This is in part because the development of copyright
policy in Canada is significantly constrained by Canada’s
international obligations under treaties such as the Berne
Convention 98 and, most recently WIPO’s Copyright
Treaty 99 and WIPO’s Performances and Phonograms
Treaty, 100 as well as its international trade obligations
under treaties such as the North American Free Trade
Agreement 101 and the TRIPS agreement. 102 In its most
recent report on copyright reform, the federal government has signaled an intention to crack down on music
downloading, and to implement the WCT, which contains provisions that have the potential to further limit
rights of fair dealing and open access to works. 103
The traditional ‘‘balancing’’ approach between the
rights of users and the rights of creators belongs, in some
respects, to a simpler era. The interests to be balanced
today are so complex and multi-faceted, that it is overly
simplistic to speak of ‘‘creators’’ on the one hand and
‘‘users’’ or even ‘‘society’’ on the other. The interests of
the actual ‘‘creators’’ of works may be very limited in the
context of industries where it is typical for commercial
enterprises such as publishers or record companies to
seek a full assignment of copyright in a work. In such
circumstances, ‘‘creators’’ rapidly take a back seat to
‘‘owners’’ of copyright. Ironically, in some cases dealing
with new and emergent technologies, the interests of
owners of copyright may ultimately be served by decisions which, by not expanding or extending their rights,
force them to adopt new business models. 104 Further,
there are many different types of creators: there are artists, musicians, writers, and photographers, but there are

97

also employees, whose day-to-day compensation has
little direct or immediate correlation with the success or
failure of a particular ‘‘work’’ (as, for example, in the
software industry). There are creators of entire works,
and value-added creators (such as publishers), there are
creators of utilitarian works (such as directories or other
fact-based works) and there are creators of more traditional types of works. In the digital and information
society, copyright has come to be the main vehicle for
protecting a wide range of works that can be called
‘‘utilitarian works’’ or ‘‘information products’’. With a
one-size fits all statute, and with the commercial sector
having much deeper pockets to support litigation, the
interpretation of copyright law has been significantly
influenced by disputes arising with respect to utilitarian
works and information products.
The diversity in the interests of ‘‘creators’’ is
matched by the diversity of interests as between ‘‘users’’
and ‘‘society’’. The two terms are sometimes used to
mean the same thing (what is good for users is good for
society), but the interests are not necessarily aligned. For
example, if society would benefit economically from a
strongly competitive digital economy, then the interests
of society might be best served by a very robust copyright system that strongly favours the rights of owners of
copyright. 105 To the extent that knowledge and information generation becomes more commercialized (even
within the university context), arguments that a robust
protection of the rights of owners of copyright better
serves the public interest gain strength. This is because,
the argument goes, being able to profit from knowledge
generation and dissemination ensures that such investments will continue to be made in such knowledge
generation and dissemination.
The point to be made here is that while the Canadian Supreme Court’s new balancing approach offers
users greater scope under the existing copyright legislation than they have ever realistically been able to hope
for, it is an approach that may be anachronistic, insufficient, and ultimately against the grain of current legislative and international directions. 106 The Court may well
be situating itself as the last champion of a much
beleagured underdog — the ordinary user, and in this
respect, the effort is welcome.

Conclusion

T

he decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in
CCH Canadian is one of the most significant copyright decisions made by that Court in recent times. In a
single decision, the Court has confirmed and consolidated its new interpretive approach to copyright law,
provided a new standard of originality in copyright,
updated the law on authorization in relation to those
who provide both the means and content for copying,
and set new, expansive parameters to the fair dealing
defence. It has done so in a way that is encouraging and
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supportive of users’ rights, and which may be of great
significance to major publicly funded users of copyright
works such as libraries, schools, and archives. At the same
time, by dealing with so many major issues in such a
relatively brief and sparsely reasoned decision, the Court
has raised new questions and created new problems for
future courts to tackle.
The message from the Court in recent decisions
such as Théberge and CCH Canadian, which recalibrate
the rights of users and creators of works into something
much more balanced than the courts or legislatures have
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arrived at in Canadian copyright history, seems ironically
at odds with the new directions for copyright law reform
proposed by the current federal government in its most
recent policy paper on copyright reform. 107 Given the
political realities of copyright policy and the legislative
level, the approach of the Court gives some hope that
users, however drastically they see their rights constrained by Parliament, may have some room for optimism in a more generous interpretive approach by the
courts.
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